In comparison-shopping services (CSS ), there exist frauds who perform excessive clicks on a target item in order to boost the popularity of it. In this paper, we introduce the problem of detecting frauds in CSS and propose three anomaly scores designed based on click behaviors of users in CSS.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the number of shoppers using comparison-shopping services(CSS ), such as Shopping.com, PriceGrabber.com, and Shopping.naver.com, is increasing rapidly due to their convenience. Given a query with some keywords, CSS provides a comprehensive comparison of items in terms of their prices and features, arranged in order of the items' popularity and relevance. This makes shoppers conveniently compare the items and decide what to buy among them just by clicking one in CSS, without visiting a number of e-commerce sites scattered over the Internet [3] .
However, in CSS, the popularity of an item can be easily manipulated by some fraudulent sellers: CSS just redirects its shoppers to individual e-commerce sites by providing a link to the page built for buying the item (i.e., features, price, and transaction) maintained in those sites; it is unaware of whether the item has been purchased because the purchase happens in e-commerce sites rather than CSS. This makes CSS evaluate the popularity of an item only relying on the number of clicks on the item. Subsequently, this motivates fraudulent sellers to click their items excessively in CSS to manipulate the rankings of their items in search or recommendation results, rather than relying on traditional marketing solutions [6] . Such fraudulent actions may result in a significantly distorted quality of search and recommendation services in CSS.
This paper addresses the problem of detecting such frauds in CSS, in an unsupervised manner. Since their behaviors * Corresponding author are quite different from that those of the frauds in different domains, such as click frauds in advertisement networks [2] , ranking frauds [6] or rating frauds [5] in online shops, and outlier detection in online social networks [1] , a novel method specific to detect frauds in CSS is required.
ANOMALY SCORES
Given a user u, our goal is to quantify her degree of anomalous behavior compared to normal users in the range of 0 and 1. To this end, we propose and examine three anomaly scores: inter-arrival time difference (a IAT u ), diurnal activity difference (a DA u ), and eigenscore difference (a ES u ). Inter-arrival time (IAT ) indicates the time interval between a pair of successive clicks conducted by an individual user. We expect that the IAT distribution of frauds is very different from that of normal users. For a user u, we first define her IAT vector Iu, where the dimension corresponds to the length of IAT and its value does the ratio of pairs of successive clicks having the corresponding IAT to all of u's pairs of successive clicks. Also, we set the dimensionality of Iu as 1,200, which indicates u's session (i.e., the sequence of her clicks during a single visit) is regarded to end if she does nothing for 20 minutes (i.e., 1,200 seconds). We then define a standard IAT vector for normal users, I normal , by averaging the values obtained from all users' Iu for each dimension. Then, we compute the distance (i.e., difference) between the two vectors I normal and Iu in order to compute a IAT u . We employ the Kullback-Leibler divergence as our distance function defined in the following: of every user in the range of 0 and 1 by min-max normalization.
We also expect that Diurnal activity (DA) is quite useful to understand behavioral differences between frauds and normal users. For each user, we discretize the timestamp of her clicks in unit of hour and define her DA vector Du, which is a 24-dimensional vector where a dimension indicates time in a day and its value does the ratio of u's clicks made in the corresponding time to u's all clicks. In the same way, we define a standard DA vector for normal users, D normal , by averaging the values obtained from all users' Du for each dimension. Then, we compute a DA u by taking the average of DKL(Du||D normal ) and DKL(D normal ||Du), and finally do min-max normalization on a DA u in the range of 0 and 1. In order to compute a ES u , we first conduct singular vector decomposition (SVD) on the clickstream dataset, which is represented as a p × q matrix where p is # of users, q is # of items × # of days, and each entry corresponds to a user's # of clicks on an item in a day. As a result, we obtain two decomposed, low-rank matrices U and V. Note that each column-vector in the left matrix U represents the degree of relevance of the corresponding user to each fraudulent pattern [4] . Among the values in each vector, we choose the highest value, which becomes the eigenscore for each user. We finally compute the distance between the average of all users' eigenscores (esaverage) and user u's eigenscore (esu) (a ES u = |esu − esaverage|).
EVALUATION
We now present the experimental results of evaluating the accuracy of our proposed anomaly scores. We used a click log dataset obtained from Naver shopping, one of the biggest CSS in Korea. It consists of 10K users, 301,840 items, and 422,610 click events traced in a period of eight months. Each click event is characterized by <userID, itemID, timestamp>, indicating userID clicked itemID at the time of the timestamp.
Since there is no ground truth data of frauds in CSS, we generated synthetic frauds and injected them into our clickstream dataset. Specifically, we considered three types of frauds, bot, burst, and low temperature, all of which may possibly exist in the real-world. We summarize the characteristics of three types of frauds in Table 2 . Every fraud selects X target items and clicks Y times for each target item. The value of X was chosen randomly from [2, 4] for each fraud, and the value of Y was chosen randomly from [150, 250] for each fraud-item pair. We created 25 frauds for each fraud type (e.g., 25 bursts) and injected them into our dataset. Then, we measured every user's suspiciousness score and determined the topk users as frauds. As accuracy metric, we employed mean average precision (MAP ). To avoid the bias from randomness, we carried out 1,000 experiments with different sets of generated frauds and took the average of 1,000 MAP s. We compared the MAP of our proposed Φor and Φ and with that of four baselines. The three of baselines are the solely-used anomaly scores, a is shown to provide low accuracy, which demonstrates that it is insufficient to determine whether a user is a fraud by considering just the number of clicks per item or per day. This is because there exist hard shoppers, who repeatedly click several items for comparison purpose but not with the fraudulent purpose. a IAT u is the best performer in detecting bots, but misses several bursts and most low temperatures. This is because the IAT of low temperature resembles that of normal users. a ES u captures more than 87.5% of frauds for all the fraud types, missing just a small portion of frauds. a DA u is shown to provide very poor accuracy when used alone. However, we observe that a DA u identifies several frauds that a IAT u and a ES u miss, which implies its potential usefulness.
